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INTRODUCTION 
It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words.  However, is a 
forty-three word Facebook post worth a possible Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) investigation?  Since 2006, Netflix CEO Reed 
Hastings has used his personal Facebook account to share everything from 
YouTube videos to pictures of his children.1  In keeping with his social 
persona, Hastings has often used his Facebook page to share the 
achievements of Netflix and its senior leadership.2  On July 3, 2012, 
Hastings posted on his Facebook page:  “Congrats to Ted Sarandos, and his 
amazing content licensing team.  Netflix monthly viewing exceeded 1 
billion hours for the first time ever in June.  When House of Cards and 
Arrested Development debut, we’ll blow these records away.  Keep going, 
Ted, we need even more!”3 
While the post received 293 “likes” from the page’s followers,4 the 
SEC had a less favorable reaction.  On December 5, 2012, the SEC 
launched a formal investigation into whether Hastings’s Facebook post 
violated the commission’s Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) 
requirements, which mandate that all investors have fair notice of when and 
where a company will post material financial information.5  The SEC 
believed that Hastings’s post violated this requirement by posting a piece of 
material financial information without making the rest of the investment 
community simultaneously aware of the disclosure.6  Suspicion of 
improper disclosure only grew when Netflix’s share price rose significantly 
in the days following the post.7 
 
 1.  See Reed Hastings, FACEBOOK (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.facebook.com/ 
reed1960?fref=ts (showing a picture of his children playing in the snow); id. at Dec. 21, 
2011 (providing a YouTube video advertising Samsung’s Smart TVs). 
 2.  See, e.g., id. at Jan. 4, 2012 (stating, “Just 10 years ago, most people connected 
over dialup.  Today we announced that Netflix members streamed over 2 billion hours of 
video from us in Q4.  Hard to imagine what the internet [sic] will enable 10 years from now.  
Very exciting.”); id. at Feb. 8, 2013 (remarking, “Great NYT Magazine spread on Ted the 
Original Algorithm Sarandos, the guy who bet our farm on House of Cards.”). 
 3.  Id. at July 3, 2012. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  See generally Chris Isidore & David Goldman, Netflix Faces SEC Probe over 
Facebook Post, CNN MONEY (Dec. 7, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/07/ 
technology/netflix-facebook-sec/ (describing the general objectives of Reg FD 
requirements). 
 6.  See Halah Touryalai, Don’t Blame the SEC, Netflix CEO’s Facebook Post is 
Questionable, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/ 
2012/12/07/dont-blame-the-sec-netflix-ceos-facebook-post-is-questionable/ (explaining the 
main issue underlying the SEC’s proposed investigation of Hastings’s conduct). 
 7.  But see id. (describing how the increased stock price may also be attributed to a 
favorable Citigroup research report that had been released on the same day as Hastings’s 
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The possibility of an enforcement action over a social media post 
prompted myriad reactions from the financial community.  Some 
commentators focused on how disclosure of information to a large social 
media audience is analogous to a press release.8  Others chided the SEC for 
opening an investigation when, in the estimation of one analyst, “more 
people saw Mr. Hastings’ Facebook post than have viewed any regulatory 
announcement in corporate history.”9  Even Hastings criticized the SEC’s 
view that sending a message to 200,000 people, many of whom were 
bloggers and reporters, could not be considered “public” disclosure.10 
Notably, the SEC changed course shortly after opening its 
investigation.  Instead of seeking an enforcement action against Netflix, the 
SEC used the incident as an opportunity to revisit its disclosure 
requirements.  On April 2, 2013, the SEC published the first set of new Reg 
FD interpretative guidelines since 2008.11  Within these guidelines, the 
SEC set new standards for when and how material financial disclosures 
could be shared by companies and executives via social media.12 
While some praised the SEC’s decision to be a “government agency 
that actually thinks innovation is a good thing,”13 not everyone shared that 
sentiment.  For example, the SEC was criticized for adopting a policy that 
invited more confusion than clarity.14  Seventy-seven percent of CFOs and 
investor relations professionals from major public companies believed the 
SEC’s report provided inadequate guidance.15  In the words of numerous 
 
post). 
 8.  See Abram Brown, Netflix CEO Reed Hastings’ Facebook Flap Forces SEC into 
21st Century, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2013, 3:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/ 
2013/04/02/sec-enters-21st-century-approves-twitter-and-facebook-for-official-disclosures/ 
(noting that it took the SEC twenty minutes to tweet the new guidelines after posting them 
on their web site).  
 9.  Andrew Hill, SEC’s Ruling Won’t Make Many Facebook Friends, FINANCIAL 
TIMES BUSINESS BLOG (Apr. 3, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/businessblog/2013/ 
04/secs-ruling-wont-make-many-facebook-friends/. 
 10.  Isidore & Goldman, supra note 5. 
 11.  Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934: Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Exchange Act Release No. 69,279, [2012-2013 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,972 (Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter SEC Report 
of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act]. 
 12.  Id. ¶ 84,972-73. 
 13.  Joshua Gallu, SEC Approves Using Facebook, Twitter for Company Disclosures, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2013, 11:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-02/sec-
approves-social-media-use-for-companies-material-disclosure.html. 
 14.  See KCSA Strategic Communications, SEC Social Media Guidelines Still Unclear 
for Investor Relations, KCSA (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.kcsa.com/kcsa_news_ 
040413_2.php (noting that the vast majority of CFOs and investor relations professionals do 
not think the SEC has given enough guidance on how to use social media to disclose 
company information). 
 15.  Id.; see also KCSA Strategic Communications, KCSA Strategic Communications 
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attorneys in disclosure practices, when it comes to using social media 
outlets for disclosure, their advice would be, “[d]on’t do it.”16 
Numerous articles and reports have discussed the complex compliance 
issues created by these new guidelines.17  While compliance is an important 
part of deciphering the SEC’s view of fair disclosure, it is not the most 
important or valuable inquiry stemming from this new report. 
The SEC’s decision to publish these new interpretative guidelines was 
not an accident.  Since its inception in 2000, Reg FD has sought to create 
an investment climate that promotes fairness through public disclosure.18  
The SEC and its leadership have long recognized that technology would 
have a significant impact in shaping and defining what is “public” and 
“fair” in the investment space.19  Even though the SEC’s social media 
guidelines are an attempt to liberalize the flow of financial information to 
investors, the Commission’s emphasis on fairness may actually chill the 
use of technologies that best align investor interests with fair disclosure.20  
In other words, the SEC’s emphasis on a 20th century definition of fairness 
may not advance the interests of 21st century investors. 
This comment seeks to explore how the SEC’s new social media 
guidelines may actually harm investors by undermining the goals behind 
Reg FD’s adoption.  Even though it is important to address the challenges 
 
Launches Investor Relations Social Media Index, KCSA (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.kcsa.com/kcsa_news_121113.php (discussing that initially only two companies 
in the Fortune 100 had notified the SEC about an intention to use social media for 
disclosures purposes as of the end of 2013).   
 16.  Frances Denmark, New SEC Ruling Plays it Safe on Corporate Disclosure via 
Social Media, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 29, 2013, at 35, available at 
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/3197961/Banking-and-Capital-Markets/New-
SEC-Ruling-Plays-It-Safe-on-Corporate-Disclosure-Via-Social-Media.html#.VEldlxYrfdl. 
 17.  See e.g., Deborah S. Birnbach, R. Todd Cronan, Lisa R. Haddad & Michael T. 
Jones, SEC Clarifies Social Media Use and Reg FD Compliance, GOODWIN PROCTER (Apr. 
5, 2013), http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsletters/Client-Alert/2013/0405 
_SEC-Clarifies-Social-Media-Use-and-Reg-FD-Compliance.aspx?article=1 (explaining the 
multitude of compliance challenges created by the new guidelines).  
 18.  See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Statement at 
the Open Meeting on Regulation Fair Disclosure (Aug. 10, 2000), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldisal.htm (stating that Reg FD was promulgated to 
further the core principles of integrity and fairness). 
 19.  See Laura S. Unger, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Rethinking Disclosure 
in the Information Age: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? (June 26, 2000), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm (describing the inherent 
uncertainties that come with the internet, technology, and disclosure). 
 20.  See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, The Board, Social Media and Regulation 
FD, N.Y. L.J., March 28, 2013, at 5 (explaining, “[T]he societal value placed on 
transparency and the immediate, widespread communication of material information to all 
investors is no longer in question; the issue is only how best to implement regulation 
supporting this value.”). 
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these guidelines create for issuers and investors,21 an equally important 
issue to address is how the SEC’s shifting culpability requirements for 
“fair” disclosure may hinder Reg FD’s mission of promoting trust and 
providing open access to relevant financial information.  To understand this 
problem, I will first trace the SEC’s early conception of Reg FD policies.  
Next, I will explain how recent guidelines are no longer in sync with 
changes in the investment community.  Finally, I will discuss the 
implications of the SEC’s attempt to better align Reg FD with modern 
conceptions of “fairness.” 
I. THE PURSUIT TOWARDS FAIRNESS: 2000 REG FD 
GUIDELINES 
A. Rhetorical Conceptions of Reg FD 
The need for Reg FD arose from growing concern that institutional 
investors had gained a strategic advantage in receiving relevant financial 
information.  Through insider conference calls and private conversations, 
institutional investors and analysts received material financial information 
before it became available to the public.22  Such practices led to a growing 
concern that once this information actually reached the public, the 
information would have already “resulted in a significant change in the 
share price or higher than usual trading volume.”23 
Despite the problematic nature of this activity, then-existing securities 
laws had not clarified when such trading behavior would be considered 
illegal.24  In response to these selective disclosure practices, then-SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt stated in 1999, “[f]or over sixty years, our markets 
have been a model for transparency and integrity.”25  However, the “long 
established precepts of financial reporting, and ethical restraint” had 
 
 21.  See e.g, Alyssa Wansor, The Facebook Status that Sparked an SEC Investigation: 
Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Growth of Social Media, 30 TOURO L. REV. 732, 744-55 
(2014) (explaining how the indeterminacies in the new guidelines may actually create more 
social media-related challenges than opportunities for investors and issuers). 
 22.  See Fact Sheet: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Rule Proposals, SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMM’N (Dec. 15, 1999), https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/sdiscfaq.htm (stating 
that “[i]n many reported incidents, companies selectively disclosed important information – 
such as upcoming earnings figures–in conference calls or meetings that are open only to 
selected securities analysts and/or institutional investors, and which exclude members of the 
public and the media.”). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at the Open 
Commission on Audit Committee Oversight, Selective Disclosure, and Insider Trading 
(Dec. 15, 1999), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/alsdisc.htm. 
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become compromised by this “emerging culture of gamesmanship within 
the financial reporting process.”26  Levitt believed that such gamesmanship 
compromised the vision that, as a nation, “we pride ourselves on having the 
purest form of meritocracy in the world” and therefore “ground ourselves 
in a trust that, through equal opportunity, everyone has a chance to 
succeed.”27 
In reaction to challenges to these historical premises, the Commission 
became “increasingly concerned” that “[t]hose privy to selectively 
disclosed information have an unfair advantage over other investors.”28  
Chairman Levitt analogized the state of the investment market to a 
“neighborhood with gated entrances and tall fences.”29  To counteract this 
problem, Levitt viewed Reg FD as a tool to bring “all investors, regardless 
of the size of their holdings, into the information loop—where they 
belong.”30  He wanted all American investors to know that it was “well past 
time to say, ‘Welcome to the neighborhood.’”31 
B. Creating a Distinct Enforcement Area 
Despite the novelty of these practices, Chairman Levitt claimed, 
“Regulation FD was not intended to be revolutionary.”32  Instead, the 
regulation as proposed had been “clearly drafted to change behavior and to 
end practices that were universally regarded as unfair.”33 
The SEC began by identifying the target audience for Reg FD.  The 
Commission did not envision these requirements as a tool for policing 
communications within the broker-dealer community.34  Instead, the SEC 
wanted the “responsibility for avoiding selective disclosure, and the risks of 
engaging in it, [to fall] squarely on the issuer.”35  However, even though the 
regulation “focus[ed] primarily on communications between issuers and 
analysts,” investment bankers also had responsibilities in the disclosure 
equation.36 
 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Levitt, supra note 18. 
 28.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 22. 
 29.  Levitt, supra note 18. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Richard Walker, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: 
Regulation FD –– An Enforcement Perspective (November 1, 2000), available at  
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch415.htm. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
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Therefore, to regulate this activity, the proposed Reg FD policy had 
two primary requirements.37  First, “whenever an issuer intentionally 
discloses material information, it [must] do so through public disclosure, 
not through selective disclosure.”38  Second, “whenever an issuer learns 
that it has made a non-intentional material selective disclosure the issuer 
[must] make prompt public disclosure of that information.”39  Under the 
proposed guidelines, the “public disclosure” requirement would be satisfied 
by filing information with the SEC, through a press release, or by 
“providing public access (for example, by phone access or webcast) to the 
conference call or meeting.”40  Chairman Levitt explained that if a 
company made an “unintentional selective disclosure,” they would be 
obligated to make that information known to the public “in short order.”41 
C. Critical Reception and SEC Reaction 
During the comment period, the SEC received 6,000 letters, mostly 
from individual investors expressing their interest in fairer market 
practices.42  During this process, there had been discussion that the SEC 
lacked enough evidence about selective disclosure problems to justify a 
new rule.43  The SEC’s head of enforcement, Richard Walker, countered 
that complaints about Reg FD’s “far-reaching effects on disclosure 
practices” indicated two realities:  (1) that selective disclosure had been 
more widespread than originally thought and (2) that retail customers faced 
even steeper disadvantages as a result of the previously allowed practices.44 
The most common concerns of Reg FD critics focused on the 
possibility “that these rules will ‘chill’ the flow of information as 
companies respond by providing less disclosure altogether.”45  However, 
Chairman Levitt envisioned that the guidelines would “provide issuers with 
a great deal of flexibility in the way they distribute information––including 
the use of new technologies over the Internet to offer extraordinary broad 
access at minimal cost.”46  Despite pushing for these higher standards, 
Levitt hedged his claims by explaining that “[w]hile these rules don’t 
 
 37.  SEC, supra note 22. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Levitt, supra note 25. 
 42.  Press Release, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Commission Votes to End Selective 
Disclosure (August 10, 2000), available at  http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/endseldi.htm. 
 43.  Walker, supra note 32. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Levitt, supra note 25. 
 46.  Id. 
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require this, I strongly urge corporate America to open up your conference 
calls to all investors.  Place them on the Internet.  The basic principle of 
fairness deserves no less.”47 
In the face of these complaints, the SEC sought to clarify that “there is 
no need for fear or hysteria, and you should not let the securities bar 
convince you otherwise.”48  He clarified that the new regulations had not 
been “designed as a trap for the unwary, as many law firms are 
counseling.”49  For example, he cited how the “express language” of the 
regulation did not seek liability for failure to make a required public 
disclosure.50  Instead, a violation would only exist if an issuer “acted 
recklessly or intentionally in making a selective disclosure.”51  Such a 
violation would not occur if the issuer simply incorrectly determined the 
materiality of a certain piece of information.52  Instead, such an omission 
would need to “represent an ‘extreme departure’ from standards of 
reasonable care” in order to reach the level of a Reg FD violation.53 
To address the “chilling effect,” the SEC explained that “any such 
effect being observed is largely due to an over-abundance of caution, fed 
by the dire predictions of numerous law firms and others opposed to the 
rule.”54  To protect against any “chilling effect,” the Commission set out to 
make it “crystal clear that Regulation FD will not cover communications 
with the media, or ordinary-course business communications with an 
issuer’s customers or suppliers.”55  The SEC’s head of enforcement, 
Richard Walker, rebuffed claims of “overzealous” enforcement efforts by 
explaining that “[t]here will be no FD SWAT Teams.”56  On the contrary, 
he believed that “second guessing reasonable disclosure decisions made in 
good faith, even if we don’t agree with them,” would “frustrate the purpose 
of the rule.”57  In addition, the SEC did not intend “to test the outer limits 
of the rule by bringing cases that aggressively challenge the choices issuers 
are entitled to make regarding the manner in which a disclosure is made.”58  
Instead, he expressed confidence that increased experience with these 
provisions would allow issuers to “become increasingly comfortable with 
 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Walker, supra note 32. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Levitt, supra note 18. 
 56.  Walker, supra note 32. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
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its requirements” and therefore “adjust their practices in conformity with 
the rule.”59 
D. Adaptability of the Original Reg FD Policies 
As a result of the public comments, the SEC made a series of changes 
that narrowed the scope of the proposed regulation.60  For example, the 
SEC decided that the regulation would only apply to issuer 
communications with the following groups:  (1) marketing professionals 
and (2) “holders of the issuer’s securities under circumstances in which it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the security holders will trade on the basis of 
the information.”61  The regulation would not be applicable to “issuer 
communications with the press, rating agencies, and ordinary-course 
business communications with customers and suppliers.”62  The SEC also 
lessened the scope of the regulation by explaining that it would only apply 
to communication from the issuer’s senior management team.63  Perhaps 
most interesting is the SEC’s hedging language that the revised Reg FD 
requirement “does not impede legitimate business communications or 
expose issuers to liability for selective disclosure arising from arguable but 
mistaken judgments about the materiality of information.”64 
E. The Envisioned Future of Reg FD Policies 
While Reg FD had largely been a reaction to unfair selective 
disclosure practices in the past, the SEC simultaneously recognized that it 
could not ignore how communication technology would adapt the 
applicability of these practices.  The emergence of the Internet at the turn 
of the 21st century led SEC officials to believe that “it is the responsibility 
of this and successor Commissions to continually evaluate the impact of 
laws and regulations on our markets and seek ways to adjust in an 
increasingly competitive global environment.”65  When Chairman Levitt 
stepped down in 2001, his temporary successor, Laura Simone Unger, took 
over the Commission at a time when communication technology was 
rapidly changing both the investment market and the savvy of investors 
themselves. 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Fact Sheet: Regulation Fair Disclosure and New Insider Trading Rules, SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMM’N (August 10, 2000), https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldsfct.htm. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Levitt, supra note 18. 
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During this period, Unger described how a majority of her time as 
Commissioner had been spent “speaking about the impact of the Internet on 
investors and the securities markets.”66  She viewed the Internet as “rapidly 
eroding the informational advantages formerly enjoyed only by big players 
in the markets” and this had resulted in “breaking down barriers to 
individual investors’ participation in offerings and the corporate 
governance process.”67 
As a result of these changes, she recognized that the SEC would soon 
need to tackle the question of, “what investors will do with the truckloads 
of information.”68  To answer this question, Unger believed that the SEC 
would need to dig deeper to answer several other different, yet correlated 
questions.  These questions included, “[w]ill the Internet deliver timely, 
relevant information to make investors more knowledgeable or will it be 
more like a dump truck depositing information that overwhelms and buries 
them?”69  Despite these more nuanced inquires, Unger felt that perhaps the 
most important question underlying all of these changes would be “whether 
average investors really want and need the level of information provided to 
professionals.”70 
Despite these challenges, Unger envisioned an information 
marketplace where “an informed investor will become a more involved 
investor.”71  She assumed that the future investor would be “cyber-savvy 
and have online brokerage accounts.”72  While she believed that not every 
investor would take advantage of this information, she assumed that most 
would.73 
Unger also viewed communication technology as a tool that would not 
only shape the knowledge base of investors, but also alter the dynamic 
between investors and financial institutions.  She viewed the Internet as a 
tool that would allow investors to both critique company decisions and help 
“unify their voices when there is a particular matter of concern.”74  Perhaps 
most prophetic was her belief that the SEC would need to “look beyond 
[its] traditional role of mandating specific company disclosures to 
determine what other information may help investors make meaningful 
voting and investment decisions.”75  While she “unequivocally” shared her 
 
 66.  Unger, supra note 19. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Unger, supra note19. 
 75.  Id. 
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predecessor’s goal of “curbing selective disclosure,” she predicted that 
certain proposals which aimed to give consumers more information may 
have the opposite effect.76 
II. LIBERALIZING DISCLOSURE: 2008 REG FD INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDELINES 
Despite many of Unger’s prophecies about the impact of 
communication technologies on disclosure practices, the SEC did not 
substantively revise its Reg FD guidelines until 2008.  Within these new 
guidelines, the SEC addressed how “[o]ngoing technological advances in 
electronic communications have increased both the markets’ and investors’ 
demand for more timely company disclosure and the ability of companies 
to capture, process and disseminate this information to market 
participants.”77  Such guidance had been “expected” due to “the speed at 
which technological advances are developing, and the translation of those 
technologies into investor tools.”78 
A. Impact of the Internet on Disclosure Expectations 
Much of the 2008 interpretative guidelines addressed how the Internet 
changed the way investors located disclosure information.  The SEC 
explained that the Commission “long recognized the vital role of the 
Internet and electronic communications in modernizing the disclosure 
system under the federal securities laws and in promoting transparency, 
liquidity and efficiency in our trading markets.”79  For that reason, the 
Commission “believ[ed] that the Internet has helped to transform the 
trading markets by enabling many retail investors to have ready access to 
company information.”80 
Such changes in the financial information marketplace necessitated 
the SEC’s acknowledgment of both the Internet’s impact on disclosure 
practices and the growing prominence of company web sites as the 
epicenter of financial information.  Under the new interpretive guidelines, 
the SEC acknowledged that “there has been a dramatic increase in the use 
of company Web sites since our 2000 Electronics Release and the adoption 
 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-58288, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,862, 45,863 (Aug. 7, 2008), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2008/34-58288.pdf. 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id.  
POLIT_FINAL (ARTICLE 6) .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2015  5:45 PM 
630 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:2 
 
of Regulation FD.”81  Therefore, company web sites had become “an 
obvious place for investors to find information about the company.”82  For 
this reason, the SEC wanted the new guidelines to “encourage the 
continued development of company Web sites as a significant vehicle for 
the dissemination to investors of important company information.”83 
The openness of this policy went as a far as recognizing that “in very 
limited circumstances, a company’s Web site can even serve as a 
standalone method of providing information to investors.”84  The SEC’s 
new stance on online disclosures represented that “[a] fundamental 
principle underlying these interpretations and rules is that, where access is 
freely available to all, use of electronic media is at least equal to other 
methods of delivering information or making it available to investors and 
the market.”85  Therefore, liberalizing disclosure requirements “allow[ed] 
companies to include more ‘interactive’ and current information on their 
Web sites than was the case previously.”86  Such a change would “[move] 
Web sites away from the filing cabinet or ‘static’ paradigm to a ‘dynamic’ 
paradigm, one shaped by the market’s desire for more current, searchable 
and interactive information.”87 
B. SEC Trepidation over the Use of New Disclosure Mediums 
Despite praising the virtues and opportunities for online disclosure 
efforts, the 2008 guidelines also echoed the SEC’s fundamental concerns 
about the ways in which liberalizing disclosure practices would 
compromise the fairness framework of Reg FD.  Within the guidelines, the 
SEC reiterated that Reg FD sought to “address the problem of selective 
disclosure of material information by companies, in which ‘a privileged 
few gain an informational edge––and the ability to use that edge to profit––
from their superior access to corporate insiders . . . .’”88  Gaining 
information in this way violated the principle that investment gains should 
come from an investor’s own “skill, acumen, or diligence.”89 
The theme of fairness is most notable in the SEC’s treatment of when 
and how disclosure within online forums would be considered adequately 
public for the purposes of Reg FD.  The guidelines stressed that great care 
 
 81.  Id. at 45,866. 
 82.  Id. at 45,864. 
 83.  Id. at 45,862. 
 84.  Id. at 45,866. 
 85.  Id. at 45,864. 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. at 45,866. 
 89.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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must be taken “when providing guidance on when information is 
considered public for purposes of assessing whether a subsequent selective 
disclosure may implicate Regulation FD.”90  Despite advances in 
technology making it “an appropriate time to provide additional guidance 
regarding the public nature of disclosures on company Web sites for 
purposes of Regulation FD,” the SEC would not take a position on 
“whether and when information on a company’s Web site is considered 
public for purposes of determining if a subsequent selective disclosure of 
such information may implicate Regulation FD . . . .”91  Instead, the SEC 
placed the burden of interpreting these standards on issuers themselves.  
Companies would need to consider whether and when:  (1) A company 
Web site is a recognized channel of distribution, (2) posting of information 
on a company Web site disseminates the information in a manner making it 
available to the securities marketplace in general, and (3) there has been a 
reasonable waiting period for investors and the market to react to the 
posted information.92 
In addition, the decision of “whether a company’s Web site is a 
recognized channel of distribution of information” would be dependent “on 
the steps that the company has taken to alert the market to its Web site and 
its disclosure practices, as well as the use by investors and the market of the 
company’s Web site.”93 
III. A BRAVE NEW WORLD FOR DISCLOSURE: 2013 REG FD 
REPORT ON SOCIAL MEDIA USE 
The SEC’s most recent set of interpretive guidelines echo a similar 
uneasy tension with accepting new communication mediums for disclosure 
while promoting Reg FD’s initial framework.  Unlike the 2008 guidelines, 
the need for the 2013 guidelines became apparent not just by recognizing a 
changing communication technology environment.  Instead, the SEC’s own 
decision to launch a possible enforcement action over Reed Hastings’ 
Facebook post prompted the Commission to review its policies in light of a 
possible disconnect between disclosure policy and acceptable corporate 
communication practices.94  For this reason, the 2013 guidelines 
approached the current state of fair disclosure practices in two parts. 
 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 45,867. 
 93.  Id.  
 94.  SEC Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act, supra 
note 11, ¶ 84,973. 
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A. SEC’s Analysis of the Netflix Controversy 
The first half of the new guidelines explained why the SEC had 
initially decided to pursue an enforcement action against Netflix.  In this 
section, the SEC described how its concern with Hastings’ post stemmed 
from more than just the content of the post. 
The SEC outlined several problematic features of the Hastings post.  
First, the SEC argued that the investment community did not have adequate 
notice from Netflix that financial information would be posted on Hastings’ 
Facebook page.95  In support of its concerns, the SEC identified that 
Hastings’ personal Facebook page had not been previously used “to 
announce company metrics.”96  Second, neither Hastings nor Netflix had 
followed the post with the kinds of corresponding documentation that are 
normally associated with the disclosure of relevant financial information.97  
Third, Hastings had not sought out the advice of other company executives 
and regulatory officials in the company, such as Netflix’s CFO or the 
investor relations department, before posting the content.98  Fourth, Netflix 
had not taken any action through its other communication channels to 
inform investors that material financial information would be located on 
the Facebook page.99 
Compounding these variables were numerous comments by Hastings, 
which established the importance of the content contained on his Facebook 
profile.  The SEC expressed concern that Hastings had previously 
described the company’s streaming hours figures as a “milestone” and “a 
measure of an engagement and scale in terms of the adoption of our service 
and use of our service.”100  Discussing such a milestone on his personal 
Facebook page appeared especially problematic since any previous time 
Netflix posted online information, it directed investors to the company’s 
social media pages, blog, or web site.101  The consistency of this disclosure 
method was substantiated by a December 2012 comment in which Hastings 
stated that “we [Netflix] don’t currently use Facebook and other social 
media to get material information to investors; we usually get that 
 
 95.  Id. ¶ 84,975.  
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id.; see also id. at 84,974 (noting, “Netflix did not file with or furnish to the 
Commission a Current Report on Form 8-K, issue a press release through its standard 
distribution channels, or otherwise announce the streaming milestone.”).   
 98.  Id. ¶ 84,974. 
 99.  Id. ¶ 84,973 (“The post was not accompanied by a press release, a post on Netflix’s 
own web site or Facebook page, or a Form 8-K.”). 
 100.  Id. ¶ 84,974 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 101.  Id. 
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information out in our extensive investor letters, press releases and SEC 
filings.”102 
The disconnect between Netflix’s past disclosure habits and Hastings’ 
post raised red flags about the acceptability of the post.  However, the SEC 
also expressed significant concern about the speed with which the post had 
been shared it’s impact on the financial markets.  Even though Netflix had 
not announced the milestone streaming numbers through any other 
conventional disclosure channel, it took only two hours for a technology-
focused blog and several news outlets to pick up the story.103  
Unsurprisingly, the financial press also began reporting the news shortly 
after the closing of markets on the release date, and analysts reacted 
positively to the news.104  Much to the concern of the SEC, Netflix’s stock 
price rose from $70.45 on the day after the post to $81.72 on the following 
day.105 
B. Addressing Social Media Disclosure Concerns 
While the first half of the SEC’s report chastised Hastings and Netflix 
for their social media disclosure practices, the Commission recognized that 
the Hastings situation created “uncertainty concerning how Regulation FD 
and the Commission’s 2008 Guidance apply to disclosures made through 
social media channels.”106  The uncertainty required the Commission to 
address two questions:  (1) how should current Reg FD policies be applied 
to Hastings’ Facebook post, and (2) how should the Commission’s 2008 
guidelines be applied to “emerging technologies,” including social media 
platforms?107 
In theory, the Report was not “aimed at inhibiting corporate 
communication through evolving social media channels.”108  For that 
reason, the SEC did “not wish to inhibit the content, form, or forum of any 
such disclosure” and was “mindful of placing additional compliance 
burdens on issuers.”109  Therefore, the guidelines sought to serve as an 
acknowledgment that companies “are increasingly using social media to 
communicate with shareholders and the market generally.”110  The SEC 
appreciated “the value and prevalence of social media channels in 
 
 102.  Id. ¶ 84,975 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id. ¶ 84,973. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. ¶ 84,976. 
 109.  Id. ¶ 84,975. 
 110.  Id. ¶ 84,973.  
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contemporary market communications” and wanted to use the Report to 
support “companies seeking new ways to communicate and engage with 
shareholders and the market.”111 
Despite this seeming embrace of social media in the disclosure 
context, the SEC exhibited significant discomfort with allowing executives, 
such as Hastings, to post material financial information on social media.112  
To interpret the acceptability of company and executive social media 
disclosure, the SEC relied on its 2008 guidelines as “a relevant framework 
for applying Regulation FD to evolving social media channels of 
distribution.”113  Such an analogy seemed relevant because company use of 
social media channels is “not fundamentally different from the ways in 
which the web sites, blogs, and RSS feeds addressed by the 2008 Guidance 
are used.”114 
The SEC reiterated, “[t]he 2008 Guidance, furthermore, specifically 
identified ‘push’ technologies, such as email alerts and RSS feeds and 
‘interactive’ communication tools, such as blogs, which could enable the 
automatic electronic dissemination of information to subscribers.”115  For 
that reason, the SEC viewed “[t]oday’s evolving social media channels” as 
“an extension of these concepts, whereby information can be disseminated 
to those with access.”116  Therefore, corporate social media pages could be 
analogized to web sites that are “created, populated, and updated by the 
issuer.”117 
Despite viewing the 2008 guidelines as a touchstone for accepting 
disclosure through company social media accounts, the Report took a less 
favorable view towards disclosure through personal accounts.  For 
example, the SEC explained that “[p]ersonal social media sites of 
individuals employed by a public company would not ordinarily be 
assumed to be channels through which the company would disclose 
material corporate information.”118 
C. Tension over the Fairness of Social Media Disclosures 
Despite finding precedent for social media disclosure in its past 
guidelines, the SEC did not seem to fully embrace such a change.  Once 
again, the burden of fairness fell on the issuers.  In the SEC’s view, the 
 
 111.  Id. ¶ 84,976. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. ¶ 84,973. 
 115.  Id. ¶ 84,976. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
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most important consideration continued to be “that widespread access to 
company information is a key component of our integrated disclosure 
scheme, the efficient functioning of the markets, and investor 
protection.”119  The SEC expected issuers to “examine rigorously the 
factors indicating whether a particular channel is a ‘recognized channel of 
distribution’ for communicating with their investors.”120  Therefore, 
“identifying the specific social media channels a company intends to use 
for the dissemination of material non-public information” is an invaluable 
aspect of providing these groups with “the opportunity to take the steps 
necessary to be in a position to receive important disclosures––e.g., 
subscribing, joining, registering, or reviewing that particular channel.”121  
The SEC took the position that “[w]ithout such notice, the investing public 
would be forced to keep pace with a changing and expanding universe of 
potential disclosure channels, a virtually impossible task.”122  Thus, the 
SEC sought to “caution issuers that a deviation from their usual practices 
for making public disclosure may affect [their] judgment as to whether the 
method they have chosen in a particular case was reasonable.”123 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF REG FD STANDARDS 
While the SEC has framed its social media guidance as “flexible 
enough to address questions that arise for companies that choose to 
communicate through social media,” it may indirectly have a far greater 
impact on the future of disclosure practices.124  However, understanding 
these future implications requires an analysis of how past guidelines have 
changed the SEC’s view of the meaning of fair disclosure. 
A review of the purpose and function of Reg FD illustrates the 
challenge of regulating fairness in an increasingly complicated information 
marketplace.  The proposed purpose of Reg FD and its initial standards 
show a strong tendency towards equating fairness with access.  The 
adoption of Reg FD was motivated by the concern that selective disclosure 
 
 119.  Id. ¶ 84,974 (quoting Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-58288, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,829, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,862, 
45,863 (Aug. 7, 2008)).  
 120.  Id. ¶ 84,976. 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. ¶ 84,973 (citing Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 
243.100 (2011)). 
 124.  Press Release, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, SEC Says Social Media OK for 
Company Announcements if Investors are Alerted, (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/ 
News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171513574#.Uyt6TvldXAI.  
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practices restricted public access to relevant financial information.125  
Making fairness synonymous with access logically flowed from an 
information marketplace in the late 1990s and early 2000s in which the 
exchange of material information occurred through interpersonal means or 
closely held conference calls.  The only way to ensure that investors could 
fully join the “neighborhood” was to provide them with equal access to this 
material financial information. 
While the SEC’s initial guidelines focused on this relationship, 
evolving communication technologies have slowly eroded the overall 
importance of access.  From Reg FD’s early adoption, SEC leadership 
recognized that the growth of the Internet would inevitably lead to 
consumers having increased access to financial information.126  For that 
reason, it was not a stretch for the SEC to accept disclosures via company 
web sites.  Such web sites represented the Internet face of companies and 
provided all investors with the ability to view and access material financial 
information. 
However, the 2013 social media guidelines represented a significant 
departure from the fairness/access relationship.  The growth of social media 
use by companies has arguably provided investors with unprecedented 
access to financial information.  Instead of having to check company web 
sites periodically, investors can now choose the kind of information they 
want to receive and access it in real time.  If the SEC still viewed 
accessibility of information as the most important component of fair 
disclosure, Hastings’ post would have been less likely to attract attention.  
Any individual could access the posted content and 200,000 people had 
received it.  This access-focused view of disclosure is likely why Hastings 
expressed frustration that the SEC would deem such a post insufficiently 
public to satisfy disclosure requirements. 
The SEC’s new guidelines presented not just an opportunity to address 
the social media question, but also signaled a shift away from viewing fair 
disclosure as a matter of providing access.  Instead, the SEC’s stance on 
social media can be viewed as a growing concern that fairness must now be 
evaluated through the lens of notice.  There are several reasons to support 
such a view.  First, the 2008 guidelines presented the underpinnings of a 
notice-based view of fair disclosure.  Within the 2008 guidelines, the SEC 
justified its acceptance of disclosure via company web sites by explaining 
that investors had begun to accept company web sites as reasonable sources 
for company-related disclosures.127 Web site disclosures allowed investors 
to have widespread access to financial information.  Notice in the context 
 
   125.    See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.  
   126.    See supra Section I.E. 
   127.    See supra Section II.A.  
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of web sites was not a concern because these sites were already where 
investors reasonably believed that they could acquire such knowledge.128 
Similarly, social media disclosures present investors with even greater 
access to relevant information.  Investors now have the ability to choose 
how and where they would like to receive that information, thus solving the 
access problem.  However, social media disclosures, unlike company web 
site disclosures, presented notice issues because investors would be less 
likely to view these platforms as the go-to source for financial information.  
For example, Lynn Turner, former SEC Chief Accountant, claimed that the 
SEC’s social media decision should be considered “bad policy” because 
“[m]any investors, especially those over 50, who in the aggregate have the 
most invested, still do not use social media.”129  Therefore, unsurprisingly, 
the new guidelines allow for social media disclosures only if investors have 
notice that social media is where material information will be posted.130  
George Canellos, acting director of the SEC’s enforcement division at the 
time Report had been published, explained that “[m]ost social media are 
perfectly suitable methods for communicating with investors, but not if the 
access is restricted or if investors don’t know that’s where they need to turn 
to get the latest news.”131  These concerns over notice can also explain the 
SEC’s reluctance to endorse social media disclosures via the personal 
Facebook accounts of company executives.132 
A. Possible Shift in Culpability Standards 
Interestingly, the SEC’s paradigmatic shift towards a notice-based 
view of fair disclosure has also been met with a different view of the 
culpability standard for enforcement actions.  Even though the SEC did not 
decide to issue an enforcement action against Netflix or Hastings, the very 
threat of such an action seems to be a strong departure from the SEC’s 
initial conception of when an enforcement action would be acceptable.  The 
early comments from SEC leadership at the time of Reg FD’s adoption 
appeared to allay the fears of companies by embracing a “benefit of the 
 
   128.    See supra note 82 and accompanying text (citing the SEC’s interpretive release 
regarding the use of company websites, which noted that company websites had become  
“an obvious place for investors to find information about the company.”). 
 129.  Gallu, supra note 13.   
   130.    See supra Section III.C.  
 131.  Nikhil Kumar, Company Results. . . you can now hear them first on Twitter, 
LONDON EVENING STANDARD (Apr. 3, 2013), available at http://www.standard.co.uk/ 
business/business-news/company-results-you-can-now-hear-them-first-on-twitter-
8558210.html. 
   132.    See supra Section III.B.  
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doubt” approach to disclosure problems.133  Possible Reg FD enforcement 
actions would only arise from gross deviation from the normal standard of 
care.134 
The threatened investigation over the Hastings post once again 
indicates that the SEC may be more focused on notice rather than access as 
a signal that a deviation from these standards has occurred.  The possibility 
of an enforcement action indicates perhaps two different views on the 
future of Reg FD enforcement.  One view is that the SEC has lowered the 
culpability standard to one that places greater responsibility upon issuers to 
ensure that information shared on social media pages is compliant with Reg 
FD guidelines.  Such a view would be consistent with the SEC’s past 
emphasis on increased issuer responsibility in the disclosure context. 
The second, and perhaps more compelling view, is that shifting the 
fairness paradigm towards notice allows the SEC to more effectively 
protect investors against pseudo-disclosure efforts by companies.  In the 
social media space, it is particularly easy for companies, such as Netflix, to 
argue that its post is “public” enough to satisfy an access-based view of 
adequate disclosure.  Since most companies communicate with investors 
across a wide variety of online platforms, it is easy to argue against an 
accusation of bad faith.  The very existence of these communication 
platforms symbolically supports a company’s view that it actively promotes 
the free flow of information with its investors. 
In contrast, a notice-based system significantly raises the bar for 
compliance.  Companies would have to adopt more formal policies to 
ensure its social media platforms are synchronized with more traditional 
disclosure locations, such as company web sites.  The SEC’s apparent 
dismay that neither Hastings nor Netflix had displayed the content of the 
Facebook post on one of the more traditional disclosure platforms supports 
synchronization.  The SEC’s focus on the location of the content, as much 
as the content itself, illustrates a belief that social media disclosures can be 
acceptable but will likely raise regulatory red flags if they are the only 
mechanism used. 
B. Creation of New Chilling Effects 
Unfortunately, the SEC’s shift towards equating fairness with 
adequacy of notice may produce the exact kind of chilling effect that had 
concerned early Reg FD opponents.  In today’s communication 
 
   133.    See supra text accompanying notes 48-59 (noting the SEC’s response to comments, 
which included a statement that Reg FD was not “a trap for the unwary” and addressing 
concerns about the possible “chilling effects” of Reg FD). 
   134.    Id.  
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marketplace, providing access is a low threshold.  There is already a 
widespread understanding that the growth and proliferation of social media 
outlets have meant that companies cannot hide in the shadows.  Gone are 
the times when companies could actively, and rather openly, share 
information with only a select few.  Now the expectation is that companies 
operate and effectively use a variety of online communication platforms.  
For that reason, providing access to company information has become an 
institutionalized norm rather than a sign of good corporate citizenship. 
Even though the emergence of new communication platforms has 
advanced Reg FD’s concern about access, it also creates new challenges in 
the sphere of notice.  When Reg FD was first adopted, the SEC leadership 
conceptualized the investment public as being encompassed by one 
“neighborhood.”135  Therefore, it logically flowed that the issuers within 
this neighborhood had the obligation to ensure that investors had the tools 
and knowledge to adequately participate in the markets.  However, the 
growth of more tailored communication channels puts the applicability of a 
universal neighborhood concept in question. 
The emergence of new communication channels have resulted in 
many of Commissioner Unger’s prophecies coming to life.136  Investors 
now have more access to financial information than ever before.  
Fortunately, the ability of investors to choose the communication channels 
they wish to use, and the sources from which that information will come, 
solves Commissioner Unger’s problem of information inundation.  This has 
resulted in a shift where investors, rather than issuers, now have a 
significant ability to dictate what disclosed information is relevant.  The 
fact that 200,000 people decided to follow one particular executive137 is a 
strong indication that investors are now much savvier about where they 
believe relevant financial information will be located. 
Unfortunately, with great opportunities come great challenges.  The 
SEC’s new emphasis on notice is problematic because the new guidelines 
paint social media outlets with a very broad brush.  Unlike company web 
sites, social media platforms display and share information in a diversity of 
ways.  How does one compare disclosure via a 140 character tweet versus 
disclosure through a Pinterest picture?138 
 
   135.    See supra text accompanying notes 29-30 (describing the SEC’s “neighborhood” 
concept). 
 136.  See supra text accompanying notes 70-75 (discussing Unger’s views on emerging 
communication technology’s future effects on the information marketplace).  
   137.    See  Isidore & Goldman, supra note 5 (noting that “Hastings currently has 245,000 
Facebook subscribers on his account.”). 
 138.  Wansor, supra note 21, at 751 (“Although the SEC has expressly permitted the use 
of Facebook and Twitter, what about the other social media channels?”).   
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Employing a one-size-fits-all approach to social media disclosure 
makes dealing with these diverse platforms a herculean task.  For example, 
if a company operates numerous online platforms, must it use every 
channel to put investors on notice about relevant information? 
Unfortunately, applying a universal view of notice to a diverse set of 
online platforms may result in social media only being useful to provide 
notice that financial information is located on a more conventional 
disclosure channel.  Such a use for social media would be a waste because 
it only shifts the way investors gain notice about information rather than 
the way they receive, consume, and use such information. 
C. Stunting the Furtherance of the Social CEO 
Unfortunately, the new SEC guidelines may also have a chilling effect 
on one of the most promising opportunities presented by the acceptance of 
social media disclosure.  Unlike at the time of Reg FD’s adoption, 
executives now have more opportunities to connect with investors on a 
broad and consistent scale.  However, the new SEC guidelines seem to chill 
such communication efforts by promoting company social media pages139 
as the superior avenue compared with executive pages. 
The SEC’s preference for company social media accounts ignores how 
rapid changes in communication mediums have fundamentally altered the 
way executives communicate and interact with Main Street.  
Unsurprisingly, the 2008 financial crisis has significantly damaged the 
American public’s perception of executives.140  While overall trust in CEOs 
has been on the rise, there are signals that those trends may not be 
continuing.141  However, the emergence of the “Social CEO” concept has 
shown strong connection between trust and engagement.  A survey 
evaluating the impact of executive social media use found that 80.6% of 
respondents believed that CEO social media use is a very or somewhat 
important tool for engaging customers and investors.142  Unsurprisingly, 
 
   139.    See supra text accompanying note 117 (noting the SEC’s endorsement of corporate 
social media pages).   
 140.  See S.D. “Shibu” Shibulal, Infosys CEO: How to lead in a Post-Financial Crisis, 
FORTUNE (June 20, 2014, 9:16AM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/20/infosys-ceo-how-to-lead-
in-a-post-financial-crisis-era/ (stating, “The events that led to the recent global economic 
crisis made it widely acknowledged as the crisis of trust.”). 
 141.  See EDELMAN, 2014 EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6  fig. 12 
(2014), available at http://www.edelman.com/insights/intellectual-property/2014-edelman-
trust-barometer/ about-trust/executive-summary/ (explaining that trust in CEOs has risen 
12% from 2009 to 2014. Despite these gains, trust in executives remained stagnant from last 
year). 
 142.  BRANDFOG, 2013 CEO, SOCIAL MEDIA, & LEADERSHIP SURVEY 1 (2013), available 
at http://www.brandfog.com/CEOSocialMediaSurvey/BRANDfog_2013_CEO_Survey.pdf. 
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CEOs who do not actively disclose financial information via their social 
media accounts may be construed as actually hiding information.143  When 
it comes to building trust, it appears that the medium is just as, if not more, 
important than the message itself. 
Despite the clear benefits arising from social media use, executives 
have still shown a relative reluctance to embrace such platforms.  For 
example, a survey of 130 company executives found that 48% did not 
engage with their company’s social media strategy or even know any 
details about such plans.144  Numerous forces have previously prompted 
this chilling effect.  These variables include, but are not limited to, 
unfamiliarity with social media platforms and/or a reluctance or fear of 
repercussions surrounding misuse.145  Such concerns are not unfounded.  
For example, Gene Morphis, the former CFO of Francesca’s, was fired 
after tweeting about a board meeting on his private social media account.146  
Even though Morphis only had 234 Twitter followers, the possibility of the 
SEC interpreting his tweet as an attempt to share insider information 
prompted Francesca’s to terminate his employment.147  Stories such as 
these, in addition to the Hastings controversy, may further breed a 
mentality that the possibility of placing oneself or one’s company in the 
regulatory cross-hairs may be enough to deter social media use all together. 
Chilling social media disclosures by executives is an indirect harm of 
the new guidelines that should not be overlooked.  Some commentators 
have argued that one of the more significant aspects of the SEC’s new 
disclosure requirements is that it “further validates an executive’s role in 
social media engagement.”148  By allowing for the possibility of executive 
disclosure, the SEC can be perceived as giving validity to the widespread 
belief in the social media world that the use of these communication tools 
should be a top-down endeavor.149 
Promoting a top-down approach advances the mission of Reg FD by 
employing a proven method of promoting trust and transparency in the 
 
 143.  Jason Ouellette, Should companies begin to use social media to disseminate 
financial data, PR WEEK US (June 1, 2013), http://www.prweek.com/article/1275624/ 
companies-begin-use-social-media-disseminate-financial-data. 
 144.  Laura Montini, Survey: Executives Have No Idea What’s Going on With Social 
Media, INC. (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.inc.com/laura-montini/executive-social-media-
involvement.html. 
 145.  Evan LePage, What the SEC’s Social Media Decision Means for Enterprises, 
HOOTSUITE BLOG (April 4, 2013), http://blog.hootsuite.com/secs-social-decision-means/. 
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investment community.  One of Chairman Levitt’s central tenets for Reg 
FD had been the belief that the health of US financial markets is tied to a 
perception of transparency.150  While the 2008 financial crisis came with 
many stories of executive actions undermining confidence in U.S. markets, 
individuals in similar roles may play an equally important role in the 
rebuilding process.  Encouraging executive social media use in the 
disclosure context supports Chairman Levitt’s vision because it presents 
“an easy way to reassure that the information is accurate and important.”151 
The decision whether to use personal social media accounts for 
disclosure purposes illustrates a fringe challenge of an evolving conception 
of fairness.  While thought leaders, such as Commissioner Unger, 
recognized that Reg FD would need to adapt with changes in 
communication technology,152 there had been less emphasis on how 
changes in technology would alter the relationship between the actors 
involved in disclosure.  It is not surprising that as investors have evolved 
and adapted, the issuers themselves have concurrently changed.  Therefore, 
the future of fairness must not just hinge on changing mediums, but 
changing relationships as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The initial premise of Reg FD has helped to promote increased 
fairness in the financial markets.  However, the current information 
marketplace makes preserving these central pillars an increasingly 
challenging task.  The world of conference calls to investors has been 
replaced by one where companies have more opportunities to communicate 
with more people in more ways than any time in history.  Communicating 
in such a way is no longer a privilege enjoyed by large public companies 
and institutional investors; rather it has become an expectation by 
consumers.  Understanding the SEC’s past concerns over fair disclosure 
and the ideological shift in its guidelines help to inform how history will 
impact the future of disclosure practices. 
 
 
   150.    See text accompanying notes 24-27 (noting that Chairman Levitt considered 
transparency as a bedrock principle of the securities markets). 
   151.    LePage, supra note 145.   
   152.    See supra Section I.E (detailing Commissioner Unger’s views). 
